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From knowledge economy to automation anxiety: a growth regime in 
crisis? 
In the 1990s, the ‘knowledge economy’ was hailed as a key driver of future 
prosperity by progressive policymakers in developed democracies. According to 
its proponents, in the knowledge economy, companies and countries alike would 
succeed by cultivating workers’ knowledge - as opposed to traditional forms of 
capital such as plant and machinery. This had radical implications for public 
policy, implying that education reform and other supply-side interventions could 
deliver inclusivity as well as prosperity. Today, however, this benevolent vision 
of the social and economic impacts of technological progress has been 
superseded by an altogether more dystopian view, associated with automation 
and the rise of artificial intelligence, as well as transformations in the digital 
economy and the evolving nature of globalisation. 
This paper analyses that transition. It charts the key assumptions of the 
knowledge economy concept, through an intellectual history that focuses on how 
these ideas manifested themselves in the rhetoric of the UK Government under 
Tony Blair. It then shows how evolving understandings of the digital economy, 
technological progress and globalisation challenge these assumptions, and the 
policy agenda that was premised on them. 
Keywords: knowledge economy, Tony Blair, New Labour, automation, 
globalisation, growth regimes, growth models 
Introduction 
In the 1990s, the ‘knowledge economy’ was hailed as a key driver of future prosperity 
by progressive policymakers in developed democracies. According to its proponents, in 
the knowledge economy, companies and countries alike would succeed by cultivating 
workers’ knowledge - as opposed to traditional forms of capital such as plant and 
machinery. Growth in cognitively demanding, well-paid work was in principle 
unbounded, and could compensate for the loss of skilled blue-collar jobs that had taken 
 
 
place during the preceding era of market liberalisation and globalisation (Reich 1991, 
Giddens 1998, 2000).  
 
Fast-forward twenty years, and this benevolent vision of the knowledge 
economy has been superseded by an altogether more dystopian view of technological 
progress, associated with automation and the rise of artificial intelligence. Whereas the 
knowledge economy had a distinctly egalitarian character - insofar as anyone with 
education could access its opportunities - the new digital economy is one in which the 
ownership of machines (and the data that underpins them) matters. Many existing high-
skill knowledge-based jobs are supposedly at risk, rendered obsolete by new 
technological advances. Furthermore, ongoing globalisation creates competition as well 
as opportunities for knowledge workers in developed democracies, as emerging 
economies such as China and India seek to capture a greater share of knowledge-based 
growth.  
 
In these changed circumstances, the public policy prescriptions associated with 
the knowledge economy no longer appear capable of delivering the outcomes that their 
proponents once envisaged. Yet the agenda of knowledge-based growth remains with 
us. The European Commission’s ‘Europe 2020’ strategy ‘for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’ emphasised investment in R&D, coupled with better education and 
wider access to high-speed internet (European Commission 2010). The OECD’s (2015) 
report on ‘The Future of Productivity’ argued that economic stagnation can be tackled 
by investing in research, removing labour market rigidities, easing regulation of 
services, increasing cross-border trade, and improving the international mobility of 
skilled workers. Prominent political figures still claim that ‘universal, affordable 
 
 
broadband… would do more than anything else to help growth to return to areas that 
have been left out and left behind’ (Clinton 2015). Although the UK government’s 
recent white paper on industrial strategy included new policies such as an ‘Industrial 
Strategy Challenge Fund’ alongside more familiar proposals around training, skills, and 
infrastructure (HM Government 2017), the amount of public investment contemplated is 
comparatively low, with the emphasis on crowding-in private sector involvement rather 
than a more active role for the state (Berry 2016). While some commentators today give 
greater weight to a broader range of policy tools, including demand-side interventions 
(Mazzucato 2015, Summers 2015), for many the emphasis on supply-side reform 
remains. 
 
This paper examines how the realities of knowledge-based growth in advanced 
democracies diverged from the vision of the knowledge economy that gained currency 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. Part One outlines how this investigation fits into existing 
debates in public policy and political economy, and the methodological approach 
adopted. Part Two surveys the concept of the ‘knowledge economy’, looking both at its 
provenance, and how it was understood in its heyday of the 1990s and early 2000s. Part 
Three examines what this knowledge economy concept implied for public policy, while 
Part Four sketches how the changing character of the digital economy, technological 
progress and globalisation have called into question the assumptions on which this 
policy agenda was premised. 
 
1. Background and Methodology 
This paper treats the idea of the knowledge economy, and the public policy programme 
built around it, as a ‘growth regime’ – that is to say, as a set of policies and practices 
 
 
that core economic actors in a given society deploy in order to deliver economic growth, 
and the understanding of the economy that underpins this agenda. Clearly, such growth 
regimes may differ significantly between countries, and over time. Nevertheless, there 
are important similarities between these regimes as well. Hall (2015) suggests that the 
economic policies pursued by developed democracies in the post-war period can be 
usefully divided into three distinct periods: the era of the mixed economy from the 
1950s to the mid-1970s, the era of market liberalisation in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
and the era of knowledge-based growth leading up to the present. Transitions between 
these growth regimes involve ‘obvious failures of policy’, which ‘set in motion a search 
for alternatives’; Hall offers the example of 1970s stagflation as motivating a move 
from post-war Keynesianism to the pro-market policies of the 1980s. Significantly, 
growth regimes are not simply technocratic strategies, reflecting developments in the 
state of the art of economics.1 They are also in some sense social contracts - agreements 
governing the reciprocal expectations of governments, firms, and citizens. 
 
On this view, the knowledge economy can be understood as a response to the social and 
economic dislocations arising from the era of market liberalisation, which saw many 
developed democracies grappling with high levels of long-term and youth 
unemployment (Hutton 1996, Hall 2015). Politically speaking, knowledge-based growth 
seemed to offer progressives such as Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder a 
way of appealing both to an educated middle class attracted to the economic and 
cultural promises of liberal internationalism, as well as to groups who had hitherto been 
‘left behind’ by globalisation. It enabled them to embrace the dynamism and efficiency 
of markets, while simultaneously critiquing the consequences of unbound neoliberalism, 




Building on Hall’s analysis, this paper suggests that the knowledge-based 
growth regime that emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s may be undergoing a 
transformative crisis, comparable to those that beset its predecessors. To this end, the 
bulk of this paper is devoted to reconstructing both the idea of the knowledge economy 
prevalent during this period (Part Two) and its public policy implications (Part Three). 
This analysis is predominantly an exercise in intellectual history, drawing on a range of 
publications and speeches by politicians, government departments, international 
institutions, as well as influential commentators in the wider public sphere. Because a 
comprehensive international survey of these ideas would be beyond the scope of a 
single article, we have focused primarily on the rhetoric and policy agenda of the UK 
government under Tony Blair, with a particular emphasis on the former Prime Minister 
and his inner circle. The UK case is in many ways archetypal of knowledge economy 
thinking more broadly: while political leaders such as Clinton and Schröder made 
reference to the concept of the knowledge economy, none invoked it as systematically 
or over such a long period as Blair and the New Labour government that he led. And 
while certain aspects of the knowledge economy debate within the UK were atypical of 
other countries - such as the importance attributed to knowledge-work in the financial 
sector - many resonated elsewhere. Consequently, the UK case enables us to see how 
the logic of knowledge-based growth can influence thinking across a range of different 
policy domains. 
 
What are the advantages of such an approach? By focusing on the explanations 
and rationalisations actually deployed by politicians, public officials, thinktanks, and the 
like, our analysis starts from the language of policy itself, directly addressing the 
 
 
assumptions and concerns of the policymaking community. This language is also the 
language in which policies were justified to the wider public; hence analysing the 
subsequent fate of these ideas may help us to explain the political fortunes of the 
politicians and parties most closely associated with them. Moreover, to the extent that 
the agenda of supply-side reform to promote knowledge-based growth remains with us, 
it is worthwhile querying the assumptions that originally accompanied it, to assess 
whether they are still plausible today. 
 
With that in mind, the penultimate section of the paper (Part Four) offers a high-
level overview of key developments in the understanding of knowledge-based growth 
over the last two decades, indicating how these qualify and challenge earlier ideas about 
the knowledge economy. The point of this section is not to make the trivial point that 
the reality of knowledge-based growth fell short of politicians’ promises. Problems of 
politics beset all such pledges: the benefits of a particular policy programme may be 
overstated in order to secure support, or because of the self-serving self-deception of its 
proponents; once in office, the advocates of a programme may prove unwilling or 
unable to implement it (or implement it fully). The goal of this paper is to demonstrate 
how the agenda of knowledge-based growth suffered from more fundamental problems 
of policy: that is to say, flaws in the understanding of the economy on which it was 
premised. Given what we know now about the nature and character of knowledge-based 
growth, this article contests that the public policy agenda of the knowledge economy 
was always destined to disappoint. 
 
This matters both for analysis and for policy. In the wake of the financial crisis, 
commentators have downplayed the significance of the knowledge economy. In the UK, 
 
 
for example, the putatively knowledge-driven growth of the ‘Great Moderation’ looks 
with hindsight like a long spell of irrational exuberance, a house-price bubble driven by 
an unsustainable expansion of household and financial sector debt (Hay 2011) - an 
approach to growth sometimes characterised as ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch 
2009). On this analysis, the subsequent policy response reads as an attempt to resurrect 
financial sector growth and asset price inflation, through measures such as corporate tax 
cuts for business and quantitative easing (Hay 2013, Green and Lavery 2015). There is a 
great deal of merit in this kind of analysis: revealing what policy elites are actually 
doing (wittingly or otherwise) rather than what they claim to be doing. But by 
downplaying the role of the knowledge economy in what has gone before, such an 
approach risks implying that knowledge-based growth offers an alternative to the policy 
agenda of recent years.  
 
By contrast, our account suggests that the knowledge-based growth regime 
existed in parallel with the privatised Keynesianism of the Anglo-liberal growth model, 
as well as with other ‘growth models’ exhibiting different characteristics – for instance, 
export-led growth, or domestic consumption premised on robust wage growth (Baccaro 
and Pontusson 2016, Hope and Soskice 2016). Whereas the financial crisis often plays a 
pivotal role in such accounts - by revealing the fragility of growth dependent variously 
on the expansion of the financial sector (Haldane et al. 2010, Thompson 2013), on the 
expansion of demand, or on the expansion of exports to demand-led economies 
(Iversen, Soskice and Hope 2016) - knowledge-based growth focuses our attention on 
the broader economic trends that predated the crisis. These include the decoupling of 
average living standards from aggregate-level growth, and the slowdown in aggregate-
level growth itself (Pessoa and Van Reenen 2012; Gordon 2012; Bivens and Mishel 
 
 
2015; Summers 2016). The analysis advanced in this paper suggests that, while the 
financial crisis and its aftermath have undoubtedly posed major challenges to 
governments in their pursuit of knowledge-based growth, the problems confronting the 
knowledge economy agenda are to a certain extent independent of these events. Even 
without the crisis, the knowledge-based growth regime would have come under pressure 
from the evolving nature of knowledge-based growth itself, in particular the emergent 
properties of the digital economy, technological progress, and globalisation. 
 
2. The Knowledge Economy 
What is (or was) the ‘knowledge economy’? The phrase itself originated in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, when management theorists and sociologists sought to contrast 
‘manual workers’ who engage in physical labour to produce conventional goods and 
services with ‘knowledge workers’ who engage in intellectual labour to produce ideas 
and information (Drucker 1967, Bell 1974). According to these commentators, 
technologically advanced economies were experiencing a shift from manual work to 
knowledge work, which would drive future growth and prosperity for individuals, firms 
and countries alike. The knowledge economy was the endpoint of this upheaval, a state 
of affairs in which knowledge work would become the dominant productive force in 
society. 
 
The concept was not widely adopted during the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 
One). One reason for this may have been that, relative to the broader shift from 
manufacturing to services over these two decades, the trends associated with the 
knowledge economy were small in size and significance. Many of the new service 
sector jobs that emerged during this period were not particularly knowledge-intensive, 
 
 
and productivity growth in service industries was not particularly impressive (Loveman 
1994). This was the period that gave rise to Robert Solow’s oft-repeated observation 
that ‘you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics’ (1987). 
Post-industrialisation and the rise of the service economy arguably served as more 
equivocal - and thus more appropriate - descriptors of socioeconomic change during this 
period than the optimistic futurism of the ‘knowledge economy’.  
 
Figure One: NGram showing relative frequency of the phrase ‘knowledge economy’ 
(Michel et al. 2011). 
 
The idea of the knowledge economy found new resonance in the 1990s, with the 
rise of home and office computing, and the advent of the World Wide Web. The 
expansion in computer ownership, and the exponential growth of IT-sector businesses 
such as Dell, Yahoo! and Microsoft, seemed to herald a paradigm shift in the wider 
economy. New ‘weightless’ business models - whereby a company’s assets were 
conceived primarily in terms of personnel and institutional knowledge, rather than plant 
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demonstrating the increasing significance of knowledge workers to the economy (Quah 
1997, Coyle 1999). The success of knowledge-intensive firms and knowledge-intensive 
industries - including computing, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, media, 
telecommunications and more - played a significant role in the revival of productivity 
growth in the UK and the US (Baily and Lawrence 2001). The inflation of the dot-com 
bubble doubtless also burnished the credentials of the knowledge economy (Howcroft 
2001), though as Figure One indicates, its subsequent collapse by no means heralded the 
concept’s demise. 
 
This economic revolution attracted the interest of management theorists, 
economists and policymakers alike. Students of management examined how companies 
could take advantage of knowledge-driven growth (Drucker 1994). Economists debated 
whether the knowledge economy might require changes in the fundamental axioms of 
economic theory, such as the law of diminishing returns (Arthur 1996). However, it was 
the interest of politicians that brought discussion of the knowledge economy out of 
academia and consultancy, and into the heart of public debate. Throughout the 1990s 
and into the first decade of the new millennium, the knowledge economy attracted the 
attention of thinktanks, public intellectuals and policymakers, who sought to understand 
how countries might best position themselves in this new economic paradigm (see e.g. 
Reich 1991, Mandelson and Liddle 1996, Clinton 1997, DTI 1998, Stiglitz 1999, Blair 
1999a, Blair and Schröder 1999, Giddens 2000). 
 
What, then, were the key features of the knowledge economy, as it was 
understood in its 1990s heyday? First and foremost, the term ‘knowledge economy’ 
indicates that knowledge workers, who produce ideas and new technologies, are in the 
 
 
ascendant. This means that they constitute the dominant force in the economy - if not 
necessarily numerically or even in terms of total gross value creation, then at least in 
terms of productivity growth. In the knowledge economy, knowledge-intensive 
industries such as advanced manufacturing, biochemical engineering, and information 
technology become essential to prosperity (Stevens 1996, Powell and Snellman 2004). 
 
A corollary of the increased importance of knowledge workers is that businesses 
that rely on traditional as opposed to human capital (such as large-scale manufacturing) 
contribute less to growth in relative terms than more knowledge-intensive businesses. 
The same is also true of businesses reliant on unskilled labour (for example, low-wage 
service industries such as cleaning and caring). ‘Productivity in the advanced 
economies, unlike in earlier stages of capitalist development, is no longer so dependent 
upon the adding of capital or labour to the production process’ (Giddens 2000). This has 
implications for the bargaining power of knowledge workers vis-à-vis other members of 
the workforce, and can thus exacerbate inequality (Autor et al. 1998, Berman et al. 
1998). However, it also has implications for the bargaining power of knowledge 
workers vis-à-vis their employers, which can mitigate the social divisions associated 
with the unequal distribution of wealth. In knowledge-intensive businesses, the 
marginal product of labour will be substantially greater than the marginal product of 
capital, with implications for the return to shareholders and other owners of wealth: 
when economies are dynamic, when innovation levels are high and productivity growth 





Indeed, in the knowledge economy, owning assets can be actively 
disadvantageous. Investment in physical assets can reduce the agility of businesses, 
committing them to particular production processes until investment costs are recouped. 
Agility is all-important, because the knowledge economy is highly dynamic: there is a 
high level of business creation, and a concomitantly high level of business failure 
(Audretsch and Thurik 2000). Entrepreneurs are constantly innovating to identify new 
markets, new products, new ideas, and they must continue to do so because the 
knowledge economy is highly competitive - not least because barriers to entry in 
knowledge-intensive industries are extremely low, once would-be competitors possess 
the necessary know-how. ‘Information and communications technologies… and 
shortening product cycles make it increasingly easy for new entrants to compete head to 
head with established players’ (DTI 1998). 
 
While manual labour, and the goods and services it produces, are not eliminated 
in the knowledge economy, their importance diminishes. Knowledge work can make 
manual processes more efficient, with the introduction of better management 
techniques, or with the automation of some manual tasks. Assuming a reasonably strong 
international intellectual property regime, if a country specialises in the production of 
knowledge (for instance, the design for a new microchip), the physical embodiment of 
that knowledge (the microchip itself) can be manufactured elsewhere (Rosecrance 
1996). The knowledge-intensive economy dominates the highest echelons of global 
value chains, guaranteeing for its workers and for the society in which they operate a 
substantial share of global growth, both in terms of output and in terms of high-skill, 




3. Public Policy in the Knowledge Economy 
Given this understanding of the knowledge economy, how did policymakers seek to 
equip their countries to capitalise on its opportunities, and to avoid (or at least mitigate) 
its downsides? In this section, we will examine how the knowledge economy informed 
the rhetoric and policy of the UK government under Tony Blair. The enthusiasm for 
knowledge-based growth expressed by key figures in Blair’s government, coupled with 
that government’s comparative longevity, make this a valuable case study for 
investigating how policymakers understood and responded to the rise of the knowledge 
economy. 
Education 
First and foremost, in order to make the transition to the knowledge economy, and 
thereby reap the rewards of growth in knowledge-intensive industries, countries need 
knowledge workers. Policymakers must therefore ensure that the education system 
provides a sustainable supply of appropriately-skilled individuals into the labour 
market. For progressives at least, this implied increased public investment in education, 
coupled with reforms to ensure that public spending delivered the educational outcomes 
required by the knowledge economy. In the UK, while in Opposition, Tony Blair had 
already set out the three main priorities of his government as ‘education, education, and 
education’ (1996). While not invoking the ‘knowledge economy’ concept explicitly, the 
logic of knowledge-based growth was clearly uppermost in his mind: 
There is only one lasting route to higher living standards, better wages, more 
secure jobs in today's world. We will win by our brains and our skills or not at all. 
 
A policy agenda in which investment in skills and innovation ultimately adds up 
to more than the sum of its parts has clear parallels with the new economic growth 
 
 
theory of the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, in terms of chronology, the new growth theory 
prompted work by the OECD, which was in turn influential in the 1990s revival of the 
‘knowledge economy’ concept (Godin 2006). According to these new theories of 
growth, innovation is endogenous – that is to say, it is not something unexplained and 
external to the economy, but rather something dependent on investment decisions 
within the economy, particularly investments in human capital and R&D (Romer 1986, 
1990). Investing in human capital thus becomes economically imperative as, over the 
long-run, innovation is the main source of productivity growth, which in turn drives 
improvements in prosperity and living standards. The championing of ‘post-neoclassical 
endogenous growth theory’ by key figures in New Labour, such as Gordon Brown and 
his chief adviser Ed Balls, was indicative of this shift towards knowledge-based growth 
(Brown 1994, Crafts 1996). 
 
For progressives, however, the point of educational investment was not simply 
to improve aggregate-level economic growth; it was also intended to address problems 
of social exclusion and inequality. According to a 2006 report prepared on behalf of the 
UK Treasury: 
where skills were once a key driver of prosperity and fairness, they are now the 
key driver. Achieving world class skills is the key to achieving economic success 
and social justice in the new global economy. (Leitch 2006, emphasis in original) 
While there was a possibility that growth in knowledge-based work could exacerbate 
social exclusion and inequality - through increasing the rewards to well-educated 
individuals, relative to their lower-skilled counterparts - advocates of the knowledge 
economy believed that education policy could mitigate this risk. Educational 
improvements would equip more and more people to participate in knowledge-intensive 
work, which would encourage innovative businesses to invest, which would lead to an 
 
 
ever-increasing number of knowledge-intensive jobs, with more and more people 
enjoying the higher incomes associated with those jobs. True, progressive proponents of 
the knowledge economy equivocated as to whether this shift to knowledge work would 
result in improved equality of outcome, and indeed whether this would be desirable 
(Blair 1999b). Nevertheless, they believed that investing in education would improve 
the lot of poorer working households (many of whom had seen their job prospects and 
living standards eroded by the loss of traditional manufacturing jobs during the 1980s) 
in absolute terms at the very least: 
When the Tories talk about the spirit of enterprise they mean a few self-made 
millionaires… But there should be a spirit of enterprise and achievement on the 
shop floor, in the office as well: in the 16 year-old who starts as an office girl with 
the realistic chance of ending up as the office manager; in the young graduate with 
the confidence to take initiatives; in the secretary who takes time out to learn a new 
language and comes back to search for a new and better job. (Blair 1996) 
 
 
Significantly, such investments in education would increasingly render other 
forms of welfare provision unnecessary. To quote Anthony Giddens, the sociologist 
often referred to as Blair’s ‘guru’ in commentaries of this period, ‘the guideline is 
investment in human capital… rather than the direct provision of economic 
maintenance’ (Giddens 1998). Admittedly, in the UK case, such commitments may 
have been more rhetorical than substantive (Smith 2014), as social protection 
expenditure remained relatively stable as a proportion of GDP between 1997 and 2007. 
Nevertheless, the GDP share of public spending on education did rise by around 20% 





Figure Two: UK public sector expenditure on education and social protection, 1995-
2007 (Office for National Statistics). 
Competitive dynamism 
Education was not the sole means by which policymakers hoped to foster knowledge-
based growth. As mentioned previously, the knowledge economy requires a high rate of 
business creation and business failure, as entrepreneurs experiment with new products, 
processes and business models. To thrive in this environment, businesses must be able 
to upscale, restructure and downsize rapidly. Traditional labour market regulations - 
including rules around hiring and firing staff, collective wage bargaining and union 
representation - stand in the way of this dynamism: 
The rapid advance of the information age, especially the huge potential of 
electronic commerce, promises to change radically the way we shop, the way we 
learn, the way we communicate and the way we relax. Rigidity and overregulation 
hamper our success in the knowledge-based service economy of the future. They 
will hold back the potential of innovation to generate new growth and more jobs. 
We need to become more flexible, not less. (Blair and Schröder 1999) 
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Increased labour market flexibility risks increasing the amount of insecure work 
in the economy as a whole, thereby leading to worse outcomes for workers. However, 
the knowledge economy’s advocates were explicit that the benefits of the knowledge 
economy should outweigh the disadvantages for the overwhelming majority. Although 
‘having the same job for life is a thing of the past’, workers are compensated for this 
loss of security by new opportunities: ‘the chance to find new jobs, learn new skills, 
pursue new careers, set up and expand new businesses – in summary, to realise their 
hopes of a better future’ (Blair and Schröder 1999).  
 
How did advocates of the knowledge economy reconcile progressive aims with 
increased labour market flexibility? The answer lies, again, in the interaction between 
education policy and the mechanics of the knowledge economy. In knowledge-based 
businesses, owners and managers are under pressure to keep their workers happy, in 
order to retain their services. If they fail to do so, then these high-skilled knowledge 
workers will leave - either to join competitors or to start rival firms on their own 
account. Because start-up costs in the knowledge economy are extremely low, there 
should be a plethora of exit options available to high-skilled knowledge workers. Under 
these conditions, it should be possible to deregulate labour markets without workers 
finding themselves substantially disadvantaged. To quote Tony Blair, ‘the challenge 
today is to make the employee powerful, not in conflict with the employer but in terms 
of their marketability in the modern workforce’ (2007): marketability compensates for 




Policies intended to facilitate entrepreneurial activity were combined with 
measures intended to incentivise entrepreneurship. Improving the financial reward for 
success was seen as an integral part of cultivating the competitive dynamism supposed 
typical of thriving knowledge economies. Lower tax rates and targeted tax breaks 
seemed an obvious way to achieve this: 
Many factors contribute to an entrepreneurial culture and some will take time to 
turn around or are difficult for the Government to influence. One powerful lever 
that the Government does have is its fiscal policy which can increase the rewards 
of success. (DTI 1998) 
Over the course of its time in office, New Labour introduced a number of reforms to the 
tax system to reward entrepreneurial activity, including reliefs that meant that affluent 
entrepreneurs could pay as little as 10% tax on capital gains on business assets (Browne 
and Phillips 2010). 
 
True, increasing incentives for success meant increasing the potential for 
inequality, particularly inequality between the richest and the rest. Historically, 
progressives of various stripes have been concerned about the impact economic 
inequality can have on wider society and social relations. However, the knowledge 
economy concept suggested that the concentration of wealth was less concerning, as the 
significance of capital to an individual’s opportunities and relative economic power was 
supposed to diminish substantially under a knowledge-based growth regime:  
the opportunities and benefits the new economy offers must not be the sole domain 
of elite knowledge workers. Learning is the key to individuals succeeding in the 
new economy… The key capability for people to survive and thrive in the new 
economy is their capacity to learn, and then to apply that learning. (Blair 2000) 
Redistribution is not necessary because wealth is not decisive for individual 
opportunity. When coupled with access to digital infrastructure – ‘to beat the divide 
 
 
between those people and regions with and those without internet access’ (Mandelson 
2002) – education should suffice to enable people based anywhere to participate in the 
dematerialised, weightless jobs that the knowledge economy provides. 
 
Domestic supply-side reforms were not the only means by which the intensity of 
entrepreneurial activity and innovation might be increased. Openness to international 
markets was a further way in which policymakers believed they could harness the 
benefits of the knowledge economy: 
In the era of rapid globalisation, there is no mystery about what works: an open, 
liberal economy, prepared constantly to change to remain competitive. The new 
world rewards those who are open to it. Foreign investment improves our 
economy. Or take immigration… People who come to work and make their lives 
here make Britain not weaker but stronger. (Blair 2005) 
Immigrant knowledge workers bring with them new ideas and insights, benefiting 
domestic firms. Overseas investors bring new technologies and expertise into an 
economy, alongside additional capital. Overseas markets offer new opportunities for 
knowledge-producing businesses to grow, meaning the potential for workers in any 
given country to move up the value chain is in essence unbounded. Robert Reich, who 
would go on to serve as Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration,2 put the 
argument thus: 
the global economy imposes no particular limit upon the number of Americans 
who can sell symbolic-analytic services worldwide. In principle, all of America’s 
routine production workers could become symbolic analysts and let their old jobs 
drift overseas to developing nations. (1991) 
 
The knowledge economy and the new laissez-faire 
The knowledge economy is not just significant in terms of what it required 
 
 
policymakers to do; it is also significant in terms of what it did not require policymakers 
to do. We have seen already that the knowledge economy did not require redistribution 
in order to achieve social inclusion, as lack of wealth does not preclude economic 
success when growth is primarily driven by knowledge rather than capital. Using 
similar logic, some advocates of knowledge-based growth argued that governments 
need not worry about the emergence of potential monopolists, because low barriers to 
entry and high levels of dynamism made it easy to challenge dominant incumbents. To 
quote Charles Leadbeater, a former Downing Street adviser, 
If knowledge-based industries tend to create monopolies, the government cannot 
alter that, other than to choose which monopolist we have. The pace of change in 
these new industries is so fast that monopolies will rarely last. (2000) 
While certain parts of the knowledge economy may be typified by winner-takes-all 
dynamics, any dominance is likely to prove temporary. Indeed, increases in the scale 
and resources of a business are likely to decrease its agility, and thus sow the seeds of 
its own downfall: ‘standard business thinking used to see big as inevitably beating 
small… now fast beats slow’ (Blair 2000). Consequently, policymakers do not need to 
take a proactive approach to dismantling monopolies in the knowledge economy: “it 
would be foolish for competition policy to back every self-styled David against its 
chosen Goliath… competition policy needs to focus on abuses of dominance, not on a 
strong position won fairly in the market-place” (Mandelson and Liddle 1996). 
 
This prohibition against political intervention was also applied to industrial 
policy. Where governments intervene in the knowledge economy - for example, by 
subsidising or otherwise aiding particular domestic champions, so that they can achieve 
the scale needed to compete on the international stage - they will inevitably end up 
supporting inefficient, substandard businesses. The pace of change in the knowledge 
 
 
economy is so fast, the ratio of failures to successful businesses so high, that 
government attempts to pick winners will almost certainly damage innovation and 
growth overall: ‘if IBM had been chosen as a national champion, and protected by 
government in the 1980s, its rising competitors, such as Apple, Microsoft and Intel, 
would probably have been frozen out’ (Giddens 2000). The best that governments can 
do is to remove barriers to competition, incentivise investment, and increase rewards to 
risk-takers (DTI 1998). 
 
Admittedly, not all commentators were critical of political intervention in the 
knowledge economy. For example, Joseph Stiglitz (who served as Chair of President 
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers in the late 1990s) was an early advocate of 
knowledge-based growth, who nevertheless argued that the knowledge economy 
contained threats to competition that governments would need to counteract (1987, 
1999). Furthermore, he emphasised the role of government in making big bets on 
technology, from supporting agricultural research in the nineteenth century through to 
the creation of the internet (1999). The more circumspect approach to the knowledge 
economy found in the work of Stiglitz and others provides a counterpoint to the more 
wholehearted techno-optimism of the likes of Anthony Giddens and Charles 
Leadbeater. Nevertheless, in UK policy circles at least, it seems that it was the optimists 
who won out: both Giddens and Leadbeater were able to adorn fin-de-siècle 
publications with approving quotations from Tony Blair, who said that Giddens’ book 
The Third Way and its Critics was ‘an important contribution to the debate’, and that 
‘Charles Leadbeater is an extraordinarily interesting thinker [whose] book raises critical 




4. The Limitations of Knowledge-Based Growth 
The previous section has shown how the rise of the knowledge economy implied that 
investment in education, deregulation of labour markets, increased financial rewards for 
entrepreneurs, and international openness could deliver inclusive prosperity. Drawing 
on analyses of developments in the digital economy, automation, and globalisation over 
the last two decades, this section sketches how several of the core assumptions 
underpinning this largely benevolent vision of the knowledge economy have become 
increasingly problematic. Such an overview is necessarily schematic: a comprehensive 
survey of the literature on these topics, let alone the underlying data, is beyond the 
scope of any single article. Nevertheless, even a preliminary examination such as this 
reveals significant challenges to knowledge-based growth regimes. 
Social inclusion, competitive dynamism and the new digital economy 
From a policymaker’s perspective, one of the key attractions of the knowledge economy 
was its potential to facilitate social inclusion (understood as wider access to better work, 
and concomitantly higher levels of material prosperity) through ‘social investment’ in 
education and digital infrastructure, rather than more substantive forms of 
redistribution. This assumed potential can in part be attributed to an idealised 
understanding of the digital sector in the 1990s, and of the business model of software 
companies in particular. In the software industry, an individual wanting to develop a 
new program faces minimal start-up costs, assuming they have the requisite skills and 
access to basic hardware. Development costs involve little more than the cost of their 
time; for digital products, manufacture and distribution costs are negligible. In short, 
Everyone with an education can have a go… Twenty-five-year-old drop-outs can 
create best-selling computer games; a nerd fresh out of college can create the 




The archetypal business of the 1990s’ knowledge economy - wherein the 
knowledge worker could expect to be well-rewarded and well-treated, because 
otherwise they could easily move to another company or strike out on their own - was 
thus a software company, with Microsoft as the most oft-cited exemplar (Giddens 2000, 
Leadbeater 2000). Contemporary analyses portrayed Microsoft’s people as its main 
asset, alongside the intellectual property that these people had developed. While 
Microsoft enjoyed substantial advantages associated with its market dominance - 
notably including the network effects arising from ownership of the ‘standard’ for 
documents, spreadsheets, and operating systems (Economides 2001) - it nevertheless 
sold a clearly defined product, produced by the knowledge work of its employees, with 
near-zero marginal costs of production and distribution once said product had been 
developed. 
 
By contrast, while the archetypal businesses of the new digital economy do 
involve software of some description - such as Facebook’s apps, or Google’s search 
algorithm - their business model is very different. The software that these businesses 
produce is given away for free, and they then sell market insight gleaned from users’ 
interactions with their platforms, and advertising space integrated into those software 
platforms themselves (Srnicek 2017). This signals a shift away from the knowledge 
economy model in which employees were companies’ main assets. Whereas computer 
programmers were central to the archetypal business of the old knowledge economy, for 
a company such as Facebook or YouTube it is users themselves who play a dominant 
(but primarily uncompensated) role in value creation. Under the business models of 
‘Web 2.0’ (O’Reilly 2007), users create content for other users to consume, such as text, 
 
 
photos, and film; their interactions with proprietary platforms create additional data 
which platform owners can then use to improve the platform, refine algorithms, and to 
generate insights to third parties (often for marketing purposes); these interactions also 
create channels for advertisers. Lack of users, and the costs of cultivating a user base 
large enough to make such a business model viable, thus act as substantial barriers to 
entry in the new digital economy.  
 
This makes it difficult to challenge today’s dominant digital companies. 
Whereas the knowledge economy assumed that incumbents were constantly under 
threat from the creation of new pieces of software or new websites, which could be 
created from scratch by any tech-savvy individual, replication of the economies of scale 
and network effects enjoyed by the likes of Facebook is far harder (Haucap and 
Heimeshoff 2014). While challengers to large incumbents can arise, these emergent 
companies require substantial capital investment to finance them through often lengthy 
periods of losses while they grow their user base. The new digital economy no longer 
appears as dynamic as the 1990s’ software industry. 
 
Software companies were not the only kind of business referenced by advocates 
of the knowledge economy: financial services, the creative industries, and science and 
engineering firms were also heralded as having high potential for knowledge-based 
growth (Leadbeater 2000). Yet, interestingly, not all of these sectors display the low 
barriers to entry deemed characteristic of the knowledge economy. While start-ups in 
fields such as advanced manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and bio-technology can form 
around a small set of core employees with good ideas, such businesses still need to 
attract capital to take these innovations through lengthy trial processes to market. The 
 
 
kind of ‘innovation’ celebrated in financial services during this period involved the 
invention of ‘the most modern instruments of finance’ (Brown 2006) - instruments that 
presuppose access to substantial reserves of capital (substantially larger reserves than 
the financial services sector possessed, as it transpired). Of the sectors celebrated by 
early advocates of the knowledge economy, only the creative industries displayed 
similar characteristics to software companies, with relatively low start-up costs beyond 
the time invested by creative individuals themselves (Garnham 2005). Yet growth of 
high-quality knowledge jobs in areas such as advertising, journalism and broadcasting 
has stalled, in part due to the impact of tech giants such as Facebook, Google and 
(Alphabet-owned) Youtube on these industries. In the decade from 2007 to 2017, 
graduate recruitment into media companies experienced the most dramatic decline of 
any UK sector, with vacancies falling by over 50% (High Fliers Research 2017). 
 
Whereas policymakers once believed education, labour market flexibility, and 
increased financial incentives for success would be sufficient to spur entrepreneurial 
activity and job creation in the knowledge economy, it appears that this is no longer the 
case. Recent data on US start-ups indicates a dramatic decline in the number of high-
growth young firms being created (Decker et al. 2016). The same downward trend in 
start-up rates is observable in many other developed democracies too, a trend that pre-
dates the financial crisis (Criscuolo et al. 2014). These findings are unsurprising: if 
barriers to entry in the knowledge economy are higher than policymakers hitherto 
assumed, supply-side interventions such as public investment in education or lower 
taxes are unlikely to deliver competitive dynamism in and of themselves. Access to 
capital becomes once again an important determinant of success. In a less dynamic, 
more capital-intensive marketplace, knowledge workers have fewer opportunities to 
 
 
strike out on their own, and there are fewer businesses in desperate need of their skills. 
Under these circumstances, the disempowerment of workers arising from the removal of 
statutory employment rights and collective bargaining arrangements is unlikely to be 
counterbalanced by an increase in their marketability. 
Automation, work and job polarisation 
Critical to marketability-based empowerment, and indeed to the appeal of the 
knowledge economy as a whole, was the promise of a surfeit of highly-paid, highly-
skilled jobs for the citizens of developed democracies. True, even optimistic advocates 
of the knowledge economy recognised that technological progress would lead to 
changes in the nature of work, and to the loss of certain types of routine jobs. However, 
they anticipated that the knowledge economy would generate proportionately more new 
opportunities for better work, and consequently that technological and economic change 
could improve the lot of the overwhelming majority. 
 
To some degree, these aspirations have been realised. Data compiled by Goos, 
Manning and Salomons (2014) shows that, between 1993 and 2010, middle-paying jobs 
(such as clerical workers and semi-skilled machine operators) declined as a percentage 
of the labour market in each of the 16 EU countries they examined. In most cases, this 
decline was primarily compensated by an increase in the share of employment in 
higher-paying occupations such as corporate managers, healthcare professionals, and 
engineers (see Figure Three). For citizens of these countries at least, the rise of the 
knowledge economy did appear to offer workers the chance to move up the value chain 





Figure Three: Changes in labour market share by job skill level, 1993-2010. 
 
However, in three out of the 16 countries surveyed, growth in the share of 
lower-paid jobs such as unskilled manual labour and personal care work outstripped 
growth in the share of higher-paying occupations. Moreover, in four of the remaining 13 
countries (including the EU’s three largest economies, France, Germany and the UK), 
the rate of growth in the share of low-paid occupations was at least half that of the 
growth in high-paid occupations. In other words, the rise of the knowledge economy 
was not associated exclusively with new higher-skilled job opportunities, but also with a 
concomitant expansion in lower-paid roles: a polarisation of the job market.  
 
Put simply, it appears that knowledge jobs are not as plentiful as proponents of 
the knowledge economy once anticipated. This becomes less surprising when we 
consider how the business models of the new digital economy can render erstwhile 
knowledge-workers redundant: digital platforms such as Uber, Deliveroo and 
TaskRabbit substitute for managerial labour, coordinating large workforces using 
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advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence threaten cognitive work that 
until recently was thought to be inefficient or impossible to automate (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee 2014). As the former Labour politician Ed Balls perceptively writes, “we didn’t 
see… that technology would pose as much of a challenge to the jobs and wages of the 
middle classes as the working classes, and perhaps more so” (2016). 
 
There are concerns that the coming wave of automation - variously billed as a 
second machine age (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014), a fourth industrial revolution 
(Schwab 2017), or a technological singularity (Shanahan 2015) - might further 
exacerbate this trend. Commentators predict that automation will continue to erode mid-
skilled, mid-paid jobs: the soft skills of customer service staff are increasingly under 
threat from automated chatbots, and the perception-reaction skills of haulage workers 
might soon be rendered redundant by the widespread adoption of driverless vehicles. In 
white-collar sectors such as law and journalism, artificial intelligence can already 
perform tasks such as document research and copywriting (Croft 2017, Keohane 2017). 
Admittedly, only the more routine aspects of these tasks can currently be automated. 
Nevertheless, unless the elasticity of demand for legal services or journalistic output is 
such that demand will increase in lockstep with rising productivity and falling prices, 
even this kind of automation will lead to the loss of existing high-skilled jobs. This has 
serious implications for the knowledge economy. What rendered the hollowing out of 
mid-skilled jobs (and with it, the shift towards greater labour market flexibility and 
consequently reduced job security) not just tolerable but desirable was the promise of an 
abundance of high-skilled jobs in their place. The new automation paradigm directly 




To be sure, fears that the automation-driven reduction of demand for labour in 
particular sectors and occupations will result in mass unemployment are almost 
certainly overstated (Autor 2015). Other things being equal, the rising income level in 
society as a whole implied by these productivity advances will mean a shift in demand 
from sectors with low demand elasticity (such as food and other necessities) to sectors 
where demand elasticity is higher (services or luxury goods). In some sectors, it seems 
difficult to discern a point at which demand could ever be satisfied - notably in 
healthcare, where spending continues to grow despite (indeed, in part because of) 
productivity advances brought about by pharmaceutical research and new medical 
machinery, and the life expectancy increases associated with them (White 2014).  
 
What really matters, from the perspective of the progressive case for the 
knowledge economy, is whether the new work that is created compensates workers 
sufficiently for the jobs that have been lost. To date, it is debatable whether this has 
been the case. Over the last two decades, diverse advanced economies have witnessed 
substantial productivity growth, reflecting the benefits of technology and innovation. 
However, during the same period, median wage levels have stagnated in most OECD 
countries (Schwellnus et al. 2017).  
 
This picture becomes even starker towards the bottom of the income 
distribution. Recall that knowledge-based growth was intended to tackle the social 
exclusion resulting from the market liberalisation of the 1980s. However, skills-based 
interventions have been remarkably poor at remedying the problem of low-paid low-
skilled work. In the UK, for example, the upskilling of low-paid workers has had 
minimal impacts on their earning ability, due to a lack of demand for the skills these 
 
 
workers are likely to acquire, and a lack of opportunities for promotion for low-paid 
workers (Lloyd and Mayhew 2010). This is consistent with job polarisation: a decrease 
in mid-paid, mid-skilled jobs provides fewer opportunities for progression for those at 
the bottom.  
 
In summary, then, the reality of job creation in the automation era falls short of 
the optimistic predictions made twenty years previously. Growth in high-skilled 
knowledge jobs has been accompanied by a significant expansion in low-paid, low-
skilled jobs. The decline in middle-skilled employment blunts the potential benefits of 
educational interventions targeted at the lower-skilled end of the distribution. Advances 
in artificial intelligence and automation, as well as the business models that dominate 
today’s digital economy, mean there is a chance that this trend towards job polarisation 
may continue, with increasing numbers of today’s knowledge jobs also under threat. 
The claim that knowledge-based growth regimes will deliver an abundance of 
financially rewarding and cognitively stimulating work appears questionable at best. 
 
Economic openness, regional inequality and knowledge-based growth 
As we have seen, for early proponents of the knowledge economy, openness to 
globalisation was vital if countries were to reap the benefits of knowledge-based 
growth. This openness allowed knowledge-intensive economies to sell their innovative 
ideas and services to a wide range of markets, and to import the lower value-add 
physical goods and services they still consumed from elsewhere. Economic openness 
also provided inflows of talented workers, investment capital and ideas, enabling 




However, some groups within developed democracies have seen little reward for 
this openness. As mentioned above, the rise of the knowledge economy is associated 
with the expansion of both high-paid and low-paid jobs in an economy. The 
geographical distribution of high-skilled knowledge work is extremely uneven, often 
exacerbating pre-existing patterns of interregional inequality (Scott 2008, Rosés and 
Wolf 2018). Economic openness can deepen these inequalities yet further: generally 
speaking, the more economically integrated a country is with the rest of the world, the 
more extreme its levels of regional inequality will be (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 
2013). This is unsurprising, given globalisation can mirror the effects of automation, 
with both robots and foreign labour acting as substitutes for traditional semi-skilled 
jobs. Nevertheless, this means that, for some communities, globalisation has destroyed 
existing jobs without bringing with it the compensatory benefits of knowledge-based 
growth. 
 
Compounding this, people in unfavoured areas may find themselves competing 
against migrant labour for whatever lower-skilled jobs are available locally. This can 
exert downward pressure on salaries, which in the UK at least are already further down 
the income distribution than those paid by the industrial employers of the past (Nickell 
and Saleheen 2015). It may also reduce incentives for employers to invest in upskilling 
the domestic population (Coulter 2018). For people in these locations, the social 
contract of the knowledge economy - where better-paid, higher-skilled work was 
promised in exchange for economic openness - has not been fulfilled. 
 
The ambiguity of economic openness in an era of knowledge-based growth is 
not solely a question of the impacts of globalisation on the ‘left behind’; it can also be 
 
 
seen at the level of competition in particular sectors. True, inward investment by 
multinational firms operating at the global technological frontier may introduce 
productive new innovations to a country. However, where such firms’ strategies entail 
seizing first-mover advantage, harnessing network effects and economies of scale that 
make them all but unassailable by would-be domestic challengers, openness to foreign 
investment may simply mean foreign ownership of monopoly rents. In recent years, a 
number of Chinese tech companies have been able to achieve dominant positions - 
domestically and regionally - in markets such as search (Baidu), e-commerce (Alibaba) 
and social media (Weibo and WeChat). It is an open question whether they would have 
enjoyed such success had the Chinese government not placed obstacles in the way of 
competition from overseas tech firms. Similarly, the success of domestic taxi-hailing 
apps in countries such as Iran (Stepp), India (Ola) and Spain (Cabify) may owe 
something to the regulatory barriers in place in this particular market sector, which have 
given domestic businesses a vital reprieve from overseas competitors such as Uber. 
 
More broadly, emerging economies such as India and China have sought to 
capitalise on knowledge-based growth in their own right, diluting the impact of pro-
knowledge policies in the developed democracies. The knowledge economy was 
initially presented as a means by which the citizens of developed democracies could 
maintain competitive advantage in a globalised era: tolerant, open, liberal, multicultural 
societies supposedly excelled in creativity and innovation, cultivating knowledge-based 
growth (Leadbeater 2000). However, emerging economies too have prioritised 
investment in skills that enable them to compete at the top-end of global value chains, 
and multinational companies have unsurprisingly attempted to source knowledge 
workers in locations where labour costs are lower (Brown and Lauder 2006). 
 
 
International competition has thus limited the growth of high-skilled knowledge jobs in 
developed democracies, contributing to the gap between the claims made on behalf of 
the knowledge economy in the past, and the experience of knowledge-based growth 
today. 
 
5. The knowledge economy: a growth regime in crisis? 
This article has argued that the realities of knowledge-based growth over the last twenty 
years have fallen short of the predictions made by a previous generation of politicians 
and policymakers. Mismatches between political rhetoric and economic reality are of 
course nothing new. What is interesting in the case of the knowledge economy is how 
several of the assumptions made about the characteristics of knowledge-based growth in 
the 1990s appear questionable in light of the subsequent trajectory of technological 
change and socioeconomic development. This suggests that the mismatch between the 
rhetoric and the reality of the knowledge economy may reflect deeper problems of 
policy – namely, flaws in the understanding of the economy on which policy 
interventions were premised – over and above everyday problems of politics such as 
exaggeration, hubris, and flawed implementation. If the business models that thrive in 
the knowledge economy are capital-intensive tech corporations that require significant 
investment until they achieve market dominance, then education alone is unlikely to 
deliver either social inclusion or competitive dynamism. If automation and new digital 
platforms imply a substantial expansion of low-skilled as well as high-skilled jobs, then 
the implications of technological change are at best ambiguous for the average worker. 
If international openness can be detrimental as well as advantageous to the development 
of domestic knowledge-businesses and knowledge-workers, then unqualified embrace 




It is important to stress the preliminary nature of this analysis, focused as it is on 
the concept of the knowledge economy prominent in UK policy circles during the Blair 
era. There is more work to be done to understand how differing ideas about the 
knowledge economy informed public policy in other countries, as well as to examine 
differences between countries’ experiences of knowledge-based growth. Moreover, 
while we have provided a high-level sketch of trends that call into question key 
assumptions of knowledge-based growth regimes, further work is needed to fully 
explore the implications of the new digital economy, technological progress and 
globalisation for the knowledge economy. Finally, to the extent that growth regimes are 
not just technocratic strategies, but also social contracts specifying the rights, 
responsibilities and expectations of a wide range of actors, the problems facing 
knowledge-based growth regimes might also create faultlines in the diverse socio-
political coalitions that supported knowledge-based growth. It may thus be fruitful to 
explore the political ramifications of the shortcomings of knowledge-based growth. 
 
However, for all the limitations of the present analysis, it does at the very least 
call into question the assumptions of knowledge-based growth, and thus the public 
policy agenda constructed around it. Given what we have learned about knowledge-
based growth over the intervening years, public policies advocated in the heyday of the 
knowledge economy concept appear unlikely to generate the kind of outcomes that their 
proponents once anticipated. It follows that simply doubling-down on a supply-side 
agenda of labour market deregulation, investment in education and improved digital 
infrastructure is unlikely to radically change the pace and character of economic growth 
in developed democracies, in and of itself. Yet, as outlined in the introduction to this 
 
 
article, influential institutions and individuals continue to emphasise supply-side reform. 
Our analysis suggests developed democracies may need to do more to address the 
challenges they face today. 
 
 
1. For a discussion of shifts in macroeconomics that complements Hall’s analysis, see Vines and 
Wills (2018). 






Arthur, W.B. (1996), Increasing returns and the new world of business, Harvard 
Business Review, 74 (4), pp. 100-109. 
 
Audretsch, D.B. and Thurik, A.R. (2000), Capitalism and democracy in the 21st 
century: from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy, Journal of 
evolutionary economics, 10 (1-2), pp. 17-34. 
 
Autor, D.H., Katz, L.F. and Krueger, A.B. (1998), Computing inequality: have 
computers changed the labor market?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 
(4), pp. 1169-1213. 
 
Autor, D.H. (2015), Why are there still so many jobs? The history and future of 
workplace automation, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29 (3), pp. 3-30. 
 
Baccaro, L. and Pontusson, J., (2016), Rethinking comparative political economy: the 
growth model perspective, Politics & Society, 44 (2), pp.175-207. 
 
Baily, M.N. and Lawrence, R.Z. (2001), Do we have a new e-conomy?, American 
Economic Review, 91 (2), pp. 308-312. 
 
Balls, E. (2016), Speaking Out: Lessons in Life and Politics (London: Random House). 
 
Bell, D. (1974), The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting 
(London: Heinemann Educational). 
 
Berman, E., Bound, J. and Machin, S. (1998), Implications of skill-biased technological 
change: international evidence, The quarterly journal of economics, 113 (4), pp. 
1245-1279. 
 
Berry, C. (2016), Industrial policy change in the post-crisis British economy: Policy 
innovation in an incomplete institutional and ideational environment, The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(4), pp. 829-847. 
 
 
Bivens, J. and Mishel, L. (2015), Understanding the Historic Divergence between 
Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Pay: Why It Matters and Why It’s 
Real (Washington DC: Economic Policy Institute). 
 
Blair, T. (1996), Leader’s speech at the Labour Party Conference. Available from: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=202 [accessed 
10 May 2018]. 
 
Blair, T. (1999a), Speech to the TUC Conference. Available from: 
http://www.ukpol.co.uk/tony-blair-1999-speech-to-tuc-conference/ [accessed 10 
May 2018]. 
 
Blair, T. (1999b), Leader’s speech at the Labour Party Conference. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/460009.stm [accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Blair, T. and Schröder, G. (1999), Europe: the Third Way/die neue Mitte (London: 
Labour Party and SPD). 
 
Blair, T. (2000), Speech at Knowledge 2000 conference. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/mar/07/tonyblair [accessed 10 May 
2018]. 
 
Blair, T. (2005), Leader’s speech at the Labour Party Conference, Brighton. Available 
from: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/sep/27/labourconference.speeches 
[accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Blair, T. (2007), Our nation’s future: the role of work. Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070506114056/http://www.pm.gov
.uk/output/Page11405.asp [accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Brown, G. (1994), Speech on how improved public services could boost growth, 
conference on global economics at the National Film Theatre, cited in Butler, D. 





Brown, G. (2006), Mansion House Speech. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/jun/22/politics.economicpolicy 
[accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Brown, P. and Lauder, H. (2006), Globalisation, knowledge and the myth of the magnet 
economy, Globalisation, Societies and Education, 4 (1), pp. 25-57. 
 
Browne, J. and Phillips, D. (2010), Tax and benefit reforms under Labour (London: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies). 
 
Brynjolfsson, E. and McAfee, A. (2014), The second machine age: Work, progress, and 
prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies (London: WW Norton & 
Company). 
 
Clinton, W.J. (1997), Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union. Available from: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=53358 [accessed 10 May 
2018].  
 
Clinton, W.J. (2015), Remarks at HFA Fundraiser in Potomac MD. Available from: 
https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/49501 [accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Coyle, D. (1999), The weightless world: strategies for managing the digital economy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
 
Coulter, S. (2018), Skill formation, immigration and European integration: the politics 
of the UK growth model, New Political Economy, 23 (2), pp. 208-222. 
 
Crafts, N. (1996), 'Post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory': what are its policy 
implications?. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12 (2), pp. 30-47. 
 





Croft, J. (2017), Law firms programmed for more technological disruption, Financial 
Times, 2 June 2017.  
 
Crouch, C., (2009), Privatised Keynesianism: an unacknowledged policy regime, The 
British journal of politics and international relations, 11 (3), pp. 382–99. 
 
Decker, R.A., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R.S. and Miranda, J. (2016), Where has all the 
skewness gone? The decline in high-growth (young) firms in the US, European 
Economic Review, 86: 4-23. 
 
Drucker, P. (1967), The effective executive (New York: Harper & Row) 
 
Drucker, P. (1994), Post-capitalist society (London: Routledge). 
 
DTI (1998), Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy 
(London: Department of Trade and Industry). 
 
Economides, N. (2001), The Microsoft antitrust case, Journal of Industry, Competition 
and Trade, 1 (1), pp. 7-39. 
 
The Economist (1997), The American Connection. Available from: 
https://www.economist.com/britain/1997/11/06/the-american-connection 
[accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
European Commission (2010), Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities). 
 
Ezcurra, R. and Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013), Does economic globalization affect 
regional inequality? A cross-country analysis, World Development, 52: 92-103.  
 
Garnham, N. (2005), From cultural to creative industries: An analysis of the 
implications of the “creative industries” approach to arts and media policy 
 
 
making in the United Kingdom, International journal of cultural policy, 11(1), 
pp. 15-29. 
 
Giddens, A. (1998), The Third Way (London: Polity Press). 
 
Giddens, A. (2000), The third way and its critics (London: Polity Press). 
 
Godin, B. (2006), The knowledge-based economy: conceptual framework or 
buzzword?, The Journal of technology transfer, 31 (1), pp. 17-30. 
 
Goos, M., Manning, A. and Salomons, A. (2014), Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-
Biased Technological Change and Offshoring, American Economic Review, 104 
(8), pp. 2509–26.  
 
Gordon, R. J. (2012), Is US economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the 
six headwinds, Working Paper 18315 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research). 
 
Green, J., and Lavery, S. (2015), The regressive recovery: Distribution, inequality and 
state power in Britain's post-crisis political economy, New Political 
Economy, 20(6), pp. 894-923. 
 
Hall, P.A. (2015), How Growth Regimes Evolve in the Developed Democracies, 
Presentation for the 22nd International Conference of Europeanists, Paris. 
Available from: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hall/files/palierces_0.pdf  
[accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Haldane, A., Brennan, S. and Madouros, V. (2010), What is the contribution of the 
financial sector: Miracle or mirage? in The Future of Finance, ed. Turner, A. et 
al. (London: LSE Report). 
 
Haucap, J. and Heimeshoff, U. (2014), Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the 
Internet driving competition or market monopolization?, International 




Hay, C. (2011), Pathology Without Crisis? The Strange Demise of the Anglo-Liberal 
Growth Model, Government and Opposition, 46(1), pp. 1-31. 
 
Hay, C. (2013), Treating the symptom not the condition: Crisis definition, deficit 
reduction and the search for a new British growth model, The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 15(1), pp. 23-37. 
 
High Fliers Research Limited (2017), The Graduate Market in 2017. Available from: 
https://www.highfliers.co.uk/download/2017/graduate_market/GMReport17.pdf 
[accessed 10 May 2018]. 
 
Hope, D., & Soskice, D. (2016), Growth models, varieties of capitalism, and 
macroeconomics, Politics & Society, 44(2), pp. 209-226. 
 
Howcroft, D. (2001), After the goldrush: deconstructing the myths of the dot.com 
market, Journal of Information Technology, 16 (4), pp. 195-204. 
 
HM Government (2017), Industrial Strategy: building a Britain fit for the future 
(London: Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy). 
 
Hutton, W. (1996), The state we're in (London: Random House). 
 
Iversen, T., Soskice, D., & Hope, D. (2016), The Eurozone and political economic 
institutions, Annual Review of Political Science, 19, pp. 163-185. 
 
Keohane, J (2017), What news-writing bots mean for the future of journalism, Wired, 
16 February 2017.  
 
Leadbeater, C. (2000), Living on thin air: The new economy (London: Penguin). 
 





Lloyd, C. and Mayhew, K. (2010), Skill: the solution to low wage work?, Industrial 
Relations Journal, 41 (5), pp. 429-445. 
 
Loveman G.W. (1994), An assessment of the productivity impact of information 
technologies, in Allen, T.J. and Morton, M.S. (eds) Information Technology and 
the Corporation of the 1990s: Research Studies (New York: Oxford University 
Press) pp. 84–110. 
 
Mandelson, P., & Liddle, R. (1996), The Blair Revolution: can New Labour deliver? 
(London: Faber & Faber). 
 
Mandelson, P. (2002), The Blair Revolution Revisited (London: Politico's Publishing). 
 
Mazzucato, M. (2015), The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public vs. private sector 
myths (New York: PublicAffairs). 
 
Michel, J.B., Shen, Y.K., Aiden, A.P., Veres, A., Gray, M.K., Pickett, J.P., Hoiberg, D., 
Clancy, D., Norvig, P., Orwant, J. and Pinker, S. (2011), Quantitative analysis of 
culture using millions of digitized books, Science, 331 (6014), pp. 176-182. 
 
Nickell, S. and Saleheen, J. (2015), The Impact of Immigration on Occupational Wages. 
Evidence from Britain (Bank of England State Working Paper No. 574, 
December). 
 
O'Reilly, T. (2007), What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the 
Next Generation of Software, Communications & Strategies, 65 (1), pp. 17-37. 
 
OECD (2015), The Future of Productivity (Paris: OECD Publishing). Available from: 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/OECD-2015-The-future-of-productivity-book.pdf. 
 
Pessoa, J.P. and Van Reenen, J. (2012), Decoupling of wage growth and productivity 





Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press). 
 
Powell, W.W. and Snellman, K. (2004), The knowledge economy, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 30: 199-220. 
 
Quah, D.T. (1997), Increasingly weightless economies, Bank of England. Quarterly 
Bulletin, 37 (1), pp. 49-56. 
 
Reich, R. (1991), The work of nations: Preparing ourselves for twenty-first century 
capitalism (New York: Alfred Knopf). 
 
Romer, P.M. (1986), Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, 94 (5), pp. 1002–37. 
 
Romer, P.M. (1990), Endogenous technological change, Journal of Political Economy, 
98 (5), pp. 71–102. 
 
Rosecrance, R. (1996), The rise of the virtual state, Foreign Affairs, 75 (4), pp. 45-61. 
 
Rosés, J.R. and Wolf, N. (2018), Regional Economic Development in Europe, 1900-
2010: A Description of the Patterns (Working Paper, No. 6952, Center for 
Economic Studies and Ifo Institute, Munich). 
 
Schwab, K. (2017), The Fourth Industrial Revolution (London: Penguin). 
 
Schwellnus, C., Kappeler, A. and Pionnier, P.A. (2017), Decoupling of wages from 
productivity (Paris: OECD). 
 
Scott, A.J. (2008), Social Economy of the Metropolis: Cognitive-cultural capitalism and 
the global resurgence of cities (Oxford: OUP). 
 




Smith, M. (2014), Globalisation and the resilience of social democracy: Reassessing 
new labour's political economy, The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 16 (4), pp. 597-623. 
 
Solow, R. (1987), Book review of Manufacturing Matters: the myth of the post-
industrial economy by Cohen, SS and Zysman, J. New York Times Book Review, 
12 July 1987, 36. 
 
Srnicek, N. (2016), Platform Capitalism (London: Polity). 
 
Stevens, C. (1996), The Knowledge-Driven Economy (Paris: OECD). 
 
Stiglitz, J. (1987), Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 3, pp. 883-937. 
 
Stiglitz, J. (1999), Public policy for a knowledge economy. Remarks at the Department 
for Trade and Industry and Center for Economic Policy Research. 
 
Summers, L.H. (2015), Demand side secular stagnation, American Economic 
Review, 105(5), pp.60-65. 
 
Summers, L. H. (2016), The age of secular stagnation: What it is and what to do about 
it, Foreign Affairs, 95, pp. 2-9. 
 
Thompson, H. (2013), UK debt in comparative perspective: The pernicious legacy of 
financial sector debt, The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 15(3), pp. 476-492. 
 
Vines, D., & Wills, S. (2018), The rebuilding macroeconomic theory project: an 
analytical assessment, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 34(1-2), pp. 1-42. 
 
White, J. (2014), The challenge of budgeting for healthcare programmes, OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, 14 (1), pp. 73-107. 
  
 
 
 
 
